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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 86 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 26/06/1997 




Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report:  [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
soft 
Date record created: 24/01/2004 Date  last modified: 24/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
victim ill (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 




At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer for two years. It was five months since he had last attended a 
revision course and four days since his last leave. The ground where the accident occurred 
was described as soft grazing land. A photograph showed baked flat ground with clumps of 
grass and low bushes. 
The investigators determined that the victim had investigated a reading in the squatting 
position with a prod. He was not "wearing his helmet properly". They identified the mine as a 
PMN (from "found fragments") and recorded that the victim's helmet and bayonet were 
"destroyed". 
The Team leader said that the deminer did not detect, mark or prod properly and that the 
Section Leader was at fault. Correct procedure should be enforced to prevent recurrence. 
The Assistant Team Leader said the victim was careless. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that, after finding metal fragments twice, the victim believed that 
the reading was another fragment. He ignored marking procedures and so prodded directly 
onto the mine. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that "all deminers must mark reading points properly and 
prod the reading points in the correct angle and position". Also that all deminers must wear 
their helmet properly when prodding, and that the Section Leader, Team Leader and 
Assistant Team Leader should be disciplined for their poor control and command in this 
instance. They also said that sick deminers must not be deployed, and Team Leaders must 
be assured that they have the authority to approve sick leave for deminers. [This implies that 
the victim may have been unwell prior to the accident.] 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 117 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: no 
Compensation: 500,000 Rs (100%) Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: Helmet 












See medical report. 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as: serious injury to both eyes, loss of two fingers on 
his right hand and his right leg injured. The medical report did not include a sketch. It stated 
that both eyes were "lost", two fingers traumatically amputated and the right leg injured below 
the knee. 
The demining group reported that the victim sustained: severe injury to both eyes, severe 
injury to forehead and right thumb, fracture right index finger, right leg wound, superficial 
chest injuries.  
A compensation claim was forwarded on 5th November 1997 in which the injuries were listed 
as: amputation of right index finger, fracture right thumb, facial injuries including blindness of 
both eyes and a forehead injury, loss of hearing to both ears, and depression.  
On 25th October 1997 the victim was assessed as: unable to use his right hand effectively; 
right leg lacerations healed; some disfigurement of face and forehead. These were taken to 
represent a 30% disability. On 18th October 1997 his loss of eyesight was assessed as a 90% 
disability. On 23rd October 1997 his hearing loss was assessed as 25%. He was being treated 
for depression.  
Compensation of 500,000 Rs (100%)was forwarded on 6th January 1998. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was working with his visor raised and his error went uncorrected.    
The visor used was 3mm thick: and reported to be several years old. It is possible that the 
victim did not wear the visor correctly because it was too damaged to see through properly 
(as was seen frequently during field visits in 1998 and1999), in which case the failure to 
provide useable equipment would represent a serious management failure.  
The use of a squatting position to "excavate" was in breach of UN requirements, but not in 
breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those requirements. The failure of 
the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt the SOP for local conditions, or 
enforce their own standards may be seen as a further management failing.   
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible. 
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